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ABSTRACT 
This paper maps the metaphors that have been used to facilitate human engagement with 
wearable technologies – extension, enhancement, augmentation - and locates the values 
and assumptions about the body and technology that they articulate.  At the same time it 
considers the figure of the cyborg, in which many of these metaphors are incorporated 
fictionally and theoretically, and locates in this figure not one (interrogative, critical) 
meaning, but many possible meanings.  The paper then goes on to explore a recent 
reconfiguring of the human-technology relationship (Schroeder and Rebelo’s (2007) 
analogy with the relationship between musician and intstrument), which it describes in 
terms of engagement – and to propose further that we need to embrace fully the embodied 
character of this relationship, in order to realize the most creative possibilities of our 
relationship with the material world as expressed in this recent technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s critical writings about the relationship between humans and technology, 
including wearable technology, have used a number of major metaphors to conceptualize 
the nature of this interaction – extension, prosthetic, augmentation.  These metaphors 
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have enabled people to use the technology by giving them an imaginary relationship with 
it, which enables it to be naturalized into their lives; to seem unexceptional.  A striking 
example from the early years of virtual reality and the internet is, of course, William 
Gibson’s metaphor of the matrix or cyberspace in Neuromancer (1986).  There is no literal 
matrix or cyberspace; indeed as some theorists have argued, the internet and the world 
wide web are temporal, rather than spatial, constructs (see Chesher, 1997).  However, 
with that imaginary creation in mind users who had never been involved with any form of 
information technology moved almost seamlessly from the typewriter to the word 
processor, quickly learning to exploit the capabilities of this new technology. 
 
Yet, even that movement was not without major cultural significance.  The typewriter was a 
major technological application of the late 19th and 20th century, which had transformed 
work practices.  It was also a feminized applicationi:  typing pools (i.e. rows of typists doing 
the equivalent of data entry from hand-written manuscripts) were almost entirely female.  
The only men who regularly used typewriters as part of their lives were writers and 
journalists, and then the machines were given compensatory masculinized characteristics; 
in fiction, they were always ‘old and beat up’ – verbal reassurance that they did not render 
their users effeminate.   
 
The word processor/personal computer had a different provenance – geek boys, computer 
nerds – a stereotype that was thoroughly and unflatteringly masculine.  And it is more 
correct to note that the move to this technology was enabled not only by an imaginative 
construct (the matrix, cyberspace) that enabled users to conceptualise the activity in which 
they were involved, but also by Apple’s development of its graphic-user interface (GUI) 
that introduced an icon-based desktop to users.  Replacing the DOS interface with its 
strings of apparently meaningless verbal symbols, Apple gave users metaphors such as 
desktop, folder, file, document, trash by which they could organize the material they 
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generated.  None of these are ‘real’ in any real-world sense; they are imaginary constructs 
that enable users to manipulate the technology in effective ways. 
 
I am using the notion of ‘the imaginary’ as conceived by philosopher, Michelle Le Doeff 
and glossed by Elizabeth Grosz as ‘a kind of “thinking-in-images”, the use of narrative, 
pictorial or analogical structures within knowledges’  (Grosz, 1989: xix).  For Grosz this 
also marks the imaginary as ‘symptomatic of an (intellectual and political) elision:  it marks 
those places within philosophical texts where the discourse is unable to admit its founding 
assumptions and must cover them over’ (Grosz, 1989: xix).  My study takes up these two 
different aspects of the imaginary.  Firstly, in Le Doeuff’s terms it is seen as enabling – in 
that we use this ‘thinking-in-images’ to move beyond the categorised and the known 
(‘knowledge’) into new experiences and new capabilities, which may subsequently be 
added to our repertoire of knowledges.  Secondly, this imaginary does reveal the 
assumptions at the basis of these new experiences and associated capabilities.  That is, 
the forms it takes and the complex of ideas and affects mobilizing them tells us about the 
nature of that engagement with technology.  And note here that this imaginary is manifest 
in many different modes, genres and media – in philosophical discourse, as Grosz notes, 
but also in the narratives that scientists construct about their work and in the arts and in 
popular media, where it is a way of thinking through the changing technological (and 
accompanying social, cultural, economic and political) context in which we live. 
 
As the essay also maps, the figure that most often populates this technological imaginary 
is the hybrid figure of the cyborg – part-human, part-machine.  Ever since Donna 
Haraway’s critical intervention in the debates about technology with ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ 
(1991), the figure of the cyborg, already a mainstay of fictional interrogations of the 
technological imaginary, became also a major trope in theoretical writing where it was 
used to explore the interrogative potential of new combinations of human-animal and 
human-machine.  My concern here is to note that the meanings of the cyborg, too, are 
4 
multiple – just as their fictional representations include the original (Arnold 
Scwarzenegger) robotic Terminator (1984), the liquid metal (Robert Patrick) Terminator of 
Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1990) and Neo and his companions in The Matrix (1999).  
The hybrid/cyborg figure may be an interrogation of western society and values, as 
Haraway argued, but it may be the reverse.  This is a crucial point, because of the 
prevalence of this figure in the many metaphorical domains of the technological imaginary 
– and because, as Grosz notes, the imaginary is intellectually and politically motivated.  
Mapping the technological imaginary of wearable technology, then, means both and 
simultaneously mapping the metaphors that have been used to articulate this imaginary, 
and the different manifestations of the hybrid (cyborg) figure that accompany those 
metaphorical constructions.  
 
WEARABLES 
In the 1980s and 1990s the term, ‘wearable technology’ conjured up Virtual Reality (VR) 
applications; now towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, VR seems 
a rather quaint formulation.  Not that VR has gone away, of course, as gaming companies 
are very aware, but its everyday applications no longer seem so attractive.  There may be 
a range of reasons for that, including people’s sickened responses to television broadcasts 
of VR-type simulations tracking US bombs to Iraqi targets; inevitably followed by 
apologetic references to the collateral damage (i.e. civilian deaths and injuries) caused by 
these attacks.  Or earlier, Ronald Reagan’s reported satisfaction that children playing 
computer games were learning to be the next generation’s fighter pilots; ‘training kids to 
kill’, as critics termed it.  Now people might use Wii to play various games, but there is 
much less publicity than in the 1990s about how the technology mirrors military 
applications. 
 
In the first decade of the 21st century wearable technology refers mostly to applications 
developed using new, ‘smart’ materials – nanotube fibres, electronic fibres that are strong, 
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durable and weavable – that are used in textiles.  These textiles can be used for a range 
of purposes, from wound dressings to sports clothing to military uniforms (Valigra, 2002; 
Adams 2005; Jewell, 2006).  As well, designers and artists are using these materials in a 
range of artifacts – clothing and jewellery – that explore the nature of contemporary 
embodiment (Baurley, 2006; Charlesworth, 2007; CuteCircuit, on-line; Heiss, 2007; 
Kettley, 2007a, 2007b; Wallace, Dearden and Fisher, 2007).  That is, designers use these 
new materials in clothing and jewellery in order to explore the ways in which users 
incorporate these artifacts into their lives – as identity, communication, comfort, play – and 
what this reveals of their understandings of the nature of embodiment. 
  
This article explores the changing nature of this technological imaginary as it has informed 
the interaction with wearable technology since the 1980s.  Of course, we can develop 
genealogies of wearable technology (e.g. Rhodes, on-line) that include earlier instances of 
wearables; however, this paper focuses on the period from the 1980s and the 
transformation of everyday life and work through the pervasive use of personal computing.  
The analysis begins with one of the earliest metaphors used to characterize this 
relationship – extension, then considers a number of other facilitating metaphors and 
associated imaginaries, before dealing with some of the most recent writing on this topic, 
which stresses the fully sensorially, even erotic, embodied engagement with new, and 
specifically in many cases, wearable technology.  
 
EXTENSION 
There has always been an erotics of wearable technology, of course, even back in the 
days when wearables mostly meant geeky head-mounted gear that was used to create VR 
for its wearer.  Its erotics was a straight-out erotics of power.  The wearer was participating 
in the development of a technology that was seen as world-changing – always a buzz – 
and which offered the individual wearer a freedom from mundane physical reality never 
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before thought possible.  Writings of the period have an onanistic quality as wearers 
exulted in the release offered by a range of visual stimuli, invisible to the outsider.  
 
And this was a very specifically-gendered world.  It was a boys’ world, in which the devices 
were a kind of power-suit, a male dress-up that offered the gratification of power not only 
channelled through, but identified as, technology. 
 
In this period the concept used to describe the human-technology relationship was 
extension – an interestingly phallic choice, given its provenance.  Its obvious referent is 
basic tool use, using a stick or implement to extend the reach of human ability, as in 
Stanley Kubrick’s famous scene in 2001: A Space Odyssey when the early primate picks 
up a bone and recognizes it as a tool (which he soon after uses to kill a rival!).  In the VR 
experiments of the 1980s the human subject wore the computer/VR device in order to 
utilize the capabilities it offered, whether as a VR interface or other IT application in order 
to extend the capacities of human perception.  At this early stage the technology was 
wearable, but not comfortable.  It did not fit within the parameters of what we normally 
consider wearable, e.g. clothing, jewellery.  It did not even have the comfort of a prosthetic 
device such as eye-glasses, which are sometimes included within a genealogy of 
wearable technology. 
 
The reasons for this were technical; computing still at this point meant hard-shell 
technology.  We might argue that there wasn’t a sufficiently innovative ‘imaginary’ at work 
to enable it to become anything else; to conceptualise technology as anything but plastic 
shells or rubber sheaths containing silicon components and electrical writing.  So wearable 
technology meant plastic components somehow attached to human users. 
 
Interestingly, as noted above, the VR focus of much of this early wearable technology 
focused on individual perception; on introducing the user/wearer into a virtual world where 
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s/he was freed from the gravity and dimension constraints of everyday life.  This is the 
world of the mind-in-a-vat that sees the materiality of the world as a hindrance to the 
freedom of the mind (Latour, 2003).  It is also the world of Neuromancer (1986) whose 
main character, Case despises his own embodiment so that when he is excluded from 
cyberspace:  ‘For Case, who'd lived for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace, it was the 
Fall.  In the bars he'd frequented as a cowboy hotshot, the elite stance involved a certain 
relaxed contempt for the flesh.  The body was meat.  Case fell into the prison of his own 
flesh.’ (Gibson, 1986:12).  Case’s engagement with cyberspace is such that he has to take 
special care not to neglect his physical body to the point that he dies of starvation. 
 
PROSTHETIC I:  ENHANCEMENT 
The character of Case differs significantly from the helmet- and glove-wearing ITC 
pioneers in that he interfaces with technology via an implanted physical jack; Case plugs 
himself into the technology or, more correctly, plugs the technology into himself.  This 
metaphor stays within the parameters of hard-shell technology, of course; simply making 
the internet a prosthetic extension of human being – or vice-versa.   
 
An analogous fictional representation is the image of Captain Jean-Luc Picard of Star 
Trek: The Next Generation after he has been transformed into Locutus of Borg, a cyborg 
member of a collective entity called The Borg (1990).  As the cyborg Locutus, Picard has 
been implanted with a weapon-arm (replacing his organic arm, or part thereof) and one of 
his eyes has been replaced with a complex visual sensor.  We see Picard laid out on an 
operating table, multiply-pierced by drilling tools, his skin blanched to bone-white.  We also 
learn that he is now psychically linked to the Borg entity.  This image carries a weight of 
cultural associations and meanings, including the dread of being fundamentally changed, 
indeed invaded, by technology.  This was a particular concern in the late 1980s and early 
1990s during the invasion of western society by a series of viral vectors, biological and 
technological; including AIDS, (fears of) Ebola, IT viruses transmitted by email (Cranny-
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Francis, 1995: 95-97).  At the same time, however, this image of technological 
transformation and related powers is compelling, particularly as Picard’s ‘humanity’ re-
establishes control over his cyborged-being; he then has the power of the technology 
under the control of his rational human mind.  As argued elsewhere (Cranny-Francis, 
2000), the Picard-Locutus cyborg does not challenge conservative notions of being or the 
political assumptions of western male rationality; he incorporates and transfigures them.  
Again, the erotics of this figure is of power; to act beyond the reach of human corporeality, 
physically and psychically.   
 
So in this case the cyborg is not the fundamentally interrogative figure it is sometimes 
considered to be, but a conservative construct that reinforces contemporary associations 
of power with middle-class, white masculinity.   And as I have argued, it partly does this 
through a further association of the cyborg figure with the image of the crucified Christ, 
which has major cultural significance in the West (Cranny-Francis, 2000, 2006); that is, 
has a major role in the Western cultural imaginary. 
 
Cultural Imaginary:  Christ as hybrid 
As Sarah Beckwith (1993) and others (Bynum (1991, 1995), and particularly Steinberg 
(1996)) argue, the body of Christ is a highly eroticized figure in the west.  Its cultural and 
religious power is based not only on its sacred meanings (as the mediator between God 
and humanity), but also on a history of eroticized encounters between worshippers and 
Christ’s body.  This is the body of the Five Wounds, an elaborated trope in which each of 
the crucifixion wounds (hands, feet, side) is worshipped in turn – and each wound is a site 
of instability, where humanity and divinity coincide.  Christ suffers these wounds to his 
human body so that he can, in his divine being as Son of God, secure the salvation of 
humanity.  At each site the worshipper contemplates the wound in an act of imitation, the 
Imitatio worship of early Christianity, through which the worshipper attempts to feel with 
Christ’s pain – to engage not only spiritually or intellectually but also physically (which 
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sometimes led to literal imitations of the crucifixion wounds).  This created its own erotics, 
a feeling-with the pain of the human Christ that linked the worshipper somatically to the 
worship.  And the wounds, as sites where the body boundary is breached, also invite the 
worshipper into the body of Christ, haptically creating the sensation of penetration/being 
penetrated that is fundamental to sexual unionii.  This complex erotics has always 
attended Christian worship in various forms and gives it extraordinary power not only 
spiritually, but also corporeally (physically, emotionally, intellectually), in the formation of 
individual Christian subjects. 
 
By participating in the erotics of the hybrid (human-divine) figure of Christ, the hybrid 
(human-machine) figure of the cyborg accrues both that figure’s corporeal appeal and its 
power, the transcendent power of the divine.  So this prosthetic image of the cyborg 
mobilizes both the erotics of power associated with the ‘extension’ metaphor, discussed 
earlier, and the sexual erotics associated with the hybrid image through its cultural 
association with the image of Christ. 
 
The figure was particularly popular through the 1980s and 1990s, with fictional 
representations ranging from the androids of Bladerunner (1982), James Cameron’s 
Terminator characters (1984, 1990), DATA, the Borg and Seven-of-Nine in Star Trek: The 
Next Generation (1988-1994) and Star Trek: Voyager (1995-2001), and the Cybermen 
episodes of Doctor Who (2006).  In everyday life it accustomed us to the sight of rational 
human beings walking the streets apparently talking to imaginary companions, but actually 
communicating via ear-pieces attached to mobile phones.  Though perhaps a closer 
analogue is the blue-tooth device that declares its prosthetic nature to the world, and 
includes its wearer in the privileged group of the technologically-extended or enhanced.  
This device prompted several episodes of Doctor Who featuring cyborg characters, the 
Cybermen.  Writer and producer, Russell T. Davies and main actor, David Tennant (The 
Doctor) explained in a post-episode documentary that the Cybermen episodes, most 
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notably ‘Rise of the Cybermen’ and ‘Age of Steel’ (2006), engage directly with the fears 
and desires provoked by this technology: 
 
Davies:   ‘People want to relate to technology, that’s…what they’re after. 
And, you know, how many people do you see walking around with the 
bluetooth attachment now…Tapping into modern paranoias and modern 
obsessions, things that people get joyous about as well – upgrading, that 
notion of upgrading, that notion that every year you can change your 
phone, you can change your FE3 player, and if you don’t keep up with 
the technology, then you’re going to be left behind.’ 
Tennant: ‘I think it’s always good to just tap into those slight worries that 
people have about modern life – mobile phones which people are now 
absolutely reliant on and yet at the same time I think we’re all slightly 
nervous about. We don’t really understand them, most of us. We don’t 
really know how this information comes into this little plastic thing that we 
carry about…That’s where all the cybermen come from anyway, this 
whole idea that the modern technology will slowly replace us, and that 
modern technology is out to get us…That’s what we see throughout that 
episode, just this whole idea that it will slowly creep up on us and we 
won’t quite notice it happening, which just makes it that worrying bit 
closer.’ 
 
This complex of fear and desire reflects our ambivalence about using technology that is so 
close to us physically; we don’t have the same fear about our cars or the planes we use to 
travel around the country, or refrigerators with various ICT functions.  However, when 
these devices begin to enter the gestalt of our physical being, to connect with us in ways 
that challenge bodily boundaries and the autonomy of the individual (a major concern of 
the Doctor Who episodes, as of the Star Trek stories of collective entities such as The 
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Borg), then they both become a challenge and require an effort of the imaginary to 
accommodate. 
 
AUGMENTATION 
One of the most recent imaginary versions of this figure – complete with Christian 
references – is in the Wachowski brothers’ films of the Matrix (1999, 2003, 2003).  The 
Neo character (played by Keeanu Reeves) represents another take on this process of 
technological hybridization – not so much enhancement but augmentation.  Neo moves 
through the Virtual Reality spaces of the Matrix as a result of his blending with the 
machine.  Like the earlier Neuromancer fantasies on which the films are based, the VR 
travelers of the Matrix films physically interface with the technology via neural jacks in their 
necks.  And when traveling in the Matrix, they leave their physical bodies behind and 
vulnerable, though their minds are free to wander in a digital body freed of many of the 
physical constraints of everyday life; hence the extraordinary, gravity-defying acrobatics of 
Neo and his companions (Cranny-Francis, 2005).  The Matrix films mobilize the earlier, 
extension metaphor that we associate with VR applications as well as the later 
enhancement metaphor where the relationship between human and machine is hybrid.  It 
is not, therefore, surprising to find the Neo character explicitly positioned in a Christ-like 
role, as the saviour of humanity. 
 
Augmentation, as explained by Ana Viseu, is another way of thinking about the nature of 
this relationship.  Viseu documents what she sees as the move from simulation, which 
uses ‘replication and separation’ (typical of VR) as guiding principles, to augmentation, 
which uses ‘connectivity and responsiveness’ (Viseu, 2003: 17).  She also refers to William 
Mitchell’s study, City of Bits (1999), which maps this move in the technological imaginary:   
 
Initially, the physical was pushed into the digital, giving rise to digital 
artifacts that looked like their physical counterparts (e.g. desktop icons).  
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Now, we are moving towards a phase of “functionality without virtuality” 
… where the digital is pushed into the physical, creating artifacts whose 
digitality is hidden.  A number of artifacts are exemplars of this: wearable 
computers, conductive fabrics that work as touch screens (Kahney 
2000), newspaper headline scanners that connect directly to the internet 
(Guernsey 2000), air conditioners with communication capabilities 
(O’Connell 2001), and artifacts that track patients’ weight loss (Knapp 
2000).   (Viseu, 2003: 17-18) 
 
And Viseu notes that a major difference here is that in the second phase the digital 
component is meant to be pervasive but not necessarily visible.  In the earlier, extension 
phase the visibility of the technology was a crucial part of its appeal; its erotics. The 
consequence of the invisibility of the technology in the augmentation phase is, for Viseu, 
the production of the hybrid (the cyborg).   
 
It is worth considering this point further since the hybrid for Viseu includes constructs such 
as the U.S. military’s Land Warrior program, the aim of which is to produce a 
technologically augmented soldier.  And Viseu includes quotes from the Land Warrior web 
site in her description: 
 
Armed with this technology the soldier becomes “a totally, 100 percent 
integrated system.  … Th[e] computer … basically control[s] and 
manage[s] all the subsystems he’s wearing” … his body is transformed 
into a personal-area network, and becomes a node within the larger 
network. (p. 19) 
 
As noted in the discussion of the cyborg above, hybridity is not necessarily socially and 
culturally critical and the Land Warrior soldier clearly is not.  Furthermore, to many 
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contemporary readers it is unlikely that his technology is invisible; it is more likely to seem 
a more comprehensive example of extension.  The FutureWarrior image that can be found 
on the U.S. Army’s web site is, in fact, striking for its similarity to the fictional character, 
Robocop in Paul Verhoeven’s film of that name (1987).   
 
In these examples of hybridity it may be that the individual technological applications are 
not so visible (e.g. the electronic fibres or nanotube laminates in the soldier’s uniform); 
however, the augmented nature of the “personal-area network” is quite apparent.  Viseu 
notes that this represents a fundamental change in attitudes to embodied human being:  
‘Here, the human is no longer the measure of all things, the entity that machines are 
designed to imitate.  The human body is viewed as being deficient, in need of 
improvement, of being enhanced with computing capabilities.’ (p. 18).  This is no longer 
the mind-in-a-vat of the VR imaginary but a construct in which the human body is 
augmented technologically, under the control of the rational human mind.  Or is it? 
 
The ambivalence in our attitudes to the cyborg and to hybridity seems to resolve on this 
question of how this new entity is characterized and what constitutes its intelligence, for as 
Viseu goes on to note, ‘the augmentation of the physical through the digital does not result 
in physical plus digital, but in a new entity with its own specificities’ (p. 22).  The ontological 
status of Locutus of Borg analysed above was seen to resolve on the control established 
over the cyborg complex by the human mind of Picard.  The nightmare scenarios in most 
science fiction narratives of hybridity occur when the technology colonizes the human 
mind, turning it into something ‘other’.  These scenarios usually present an artificial 
intelligence vanquishing the human elements of the hybrid, conventionally presented as 
‘the emotions’.  When the human is gone, there are no emotions; there are also no verbal 
contractions in the entity’s diction!   
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The other possibility is that suggested by Viseu, of a synergy between human and 
technology – a new entity with a different kind of being, including a different kind of 
intelligence, a different sensorium, a different way of being-in-the-world (to use 
Heidegger’s sense of that term).  This may be problematic and Viseu refers to the example 
of a work wearable that ‘can be programmed to, after five minutes of perceived inactivity – 
inactivity being defined the wearable’s owner, not its user – send a message directly to the 
wearer’s retina saying ‘go back to work’.’ (p. 23).  Elsewhere I have considered in some 
detail the way in which the FutureWarrior type hybrid can be seen in Heideggerian terms 
as creating a ‘standing reserve’ that has no regard for the individual subjects (human 
and/or hybrid) that comprise it (Cranny-Francis, 2007, 2008).  As ‘a node within the larger 
network’ the hybrid entity may be subject to decision-making processes that disregard or 
diminish the importance of her/his/its individual being (though this may not be at odds with 
the ethics of the new hybrid entity, which may be more collective).   
 
Alternatively, we might posit a very different kind of outcome of this hybridity, with 
reference to Medard Hilhorst’s discussion of ‘prosthetic fit’ (Hilhorst, 2004).   
 
PROSTHETIC II: DIFFERENCE 
Hilhorst’s article considers a highly-coloured hook prosthesis designed for children who 
are missing a hand, and compares responses to it with responses to the more 
conventional prostheses – the flesh-coloured artificial hand that most parents favour for 
their children and the more utilitarian hook.  Hilhorst’s interest is in the social implications 
of the children’s choice of the colourful prosthetic that is patently artificial.  He notes that: 
 
One can call it a ‘prosthesis’ (substitute) or ‘orthosis’ (extension), as long 
as one does not suggest the connotations that often go with that to make 
a body more complete, to fill up what is missing, to repair a deficient 
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body, to restore normality, etc.  Its colors alone suggest a different 
message …    (Hilhorst, 2004: 304) 
 
Hilhorst identifies that message as:  ‘”this object can be displayed,and the person who 
wears it (you, I) may also certainly display herself in this way’” and adds: ‘A message like 
this comprises both an invitation and an encouragement: the individual is invited to wear 
the prosthesis with self-awareness, but it also supported by the message to do so with 
self-confidence.’ (p.  305)  This offers a useful counter to dystopian visions of prosthetic 
technologies, arguing instead that:  ‘the person who chooses to wear this device 
emphasizes the value to herself – as she sees it – of her bodily difference, and perhaps 
also the importance of it for those meeting her.’ (p. 305)  In other words, whether we focus 
specifically on the human actor or on the human-prosthetic hybrid, what this choice 
represents is an acceptance, even declaration, of difference and of specificity.   
 
If we refer this argument to Viseu’s discussion of the hybrid, we find a real-world example 
of that new synergy to which she refers – a hybrid with her own specificity, able to act out 
of that specificity.  Which does not discount the other possibility, of a prosthetic that 
colonizes the embodied subject, converting her/him into a ‘nodal point’.  It simply makes 
the point that this is not the only or inevitable outcome.  The hybrid may be the prosthetic-
wearer who chooses to proclaim her difference from others by using a patently artificial 
prosthetic and who is effectively supported in that declaration by its usefulness and 
appeal.  Hilhorst’s argument is that this is also a powerful support to the individual 
subjectivity of that wearer. 
 
We might refer this argument also to contemporary applications such as CuteCircuit’s 
HugShirt (Cranny-Francis 2007, 2008).  The HugShirt uses electronics to create the 
sensation of a hug in the wearer of a sweatshirt:  
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The system is very simple: a Hug Shirt (Bluetooth with sensors and 
actuators), a Bluetooth java enabled mobile phone with the Hug Me java 
software running (it understands what the sensors are communicating), 
and on the other side another phone and another shirt. If you do not 
have a Hug Shirt but know that your friend has one you can still send 
them a hug creating it with the HugMe software and it will be delivered to 
your friend’s Hug Shirt! 
… 
When touching the red areas on your Hug Shirt your mobile phone 
receives the sensors data via Bluetooth (hug pressure, skin temperature, 
heartbeat rate, time you are hugging for, etc) and then delivers it to the 
other person.     (CuteCircuit, on-line) 
 
Is the wearer of the HugShirt complicit in the replacement of actual human intimacy by 
human-machine interaction?  This is one question that is commonly prompted by the 
HugShirt and by other wearables that are used in applications that enable a remote form 
of sensory interaction: do they represent the destruction of the human sensorium and its 
replacement by the cold heart of technology? 
 
With reference to the work of Hilhorst we might argue instead that the HugShirt-wearer is 
an example of the hybrid who declares her/his/its difference and specificity.  That this is 
not about the destruction of the human senses but about another sensory experience 
altogether.  As Francesca Rosella of CuteCircuit has explained, the sender of the Hug and 
the wearer of the HugShirt are engaged in a new choreography of space-time.  The 
sender has taken the time to choose the hug (from a set of choices), and the wearer of the 
HugShirt has accepted it; together they create a unique experience, which is the sensory 
pleasure of the receiver and the affective delight and, we might suggest, proprioceptive 
sensation of the hug experienced by the sender.  The experience of both is based, in this 
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scenario, on the bodily memory of past hugs (Rosella, personal communication 2006).  
Neither the sender nor the wearer is pretending that this is a human hug; rather both 
accept the experience as of another order but one that has its own modality and own 
value.   
 
Sharon Baurley of the University of the Arts in London has also worked extensively on 
clothing that reacts to mobile phone signals: for example, narrow pleating in a sleeve that 
contracts and expands to convey the sensation of a caress, warming pads that heat up to 
convey the warmth and pressure of bodily contact.  One of the participants in Baurley’s 
experiments confirmed Francesca Rosella’s  views on the value of this communication 
when he said:   
 
Just the fact that you are linked, you are communicating and you are 
linked through several senses. If you are facing someone you have 
visual, tactile, spoken word, etc.  And when you are remote you can’t see 
that person all you have is text, spoken word, but if you can see things 
are happening to this person at the other end, you feel closer to that 
person.  (Baurley, 2006)   
 
Again there is no pretence that this is the equivalent of a human touch; rather it is another 
way of touching, of creating communication and intimacy.  It is that different experience, 
that different knowledge that constitutes the hybrid of Viseu’s discussion.    
 
ENGAGEMENT   
The technological sophistication shown by the users of a range of contemporary 
applications such as Baurley’s wearables (quoted above), introduces the final metaphor I 
want to address in this paper – which is engagement.  Engagement evokes an imaginary 
that acknowledges the artificiality of technology, but neither rejects nor colonizes it.  
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Instead it interfaces with the technology in a sensuous way, exploring its difference, 
combining with it to create a new coupling – which is the hybrid.   
 
In their paper, “Wearable Music in Engaging Technologies” (2007) Franziska Schroeder 
and Pedro Rebelo propose the relationship between the musician and her instrument as a 
model for human-machine interaction: 
 
We address the relationship between a music performer and her 
instrument as a possible model for re-thinking wearable technologies.  
Both musical instruments and textiles invite participation, and by 
engaging with them we intuitively develop a sense of their malleability, 
resistance and fragility.  In the action of touching we not only sense, but 
more importantly, we react: we adjust the nature of our touch according 
to a particular material’s property. (Schroeder and Rebelo, 2007: 85) 
 
Schroeder and Rebelo note that the metaphor of extension has been applied to the 
relationship between performer and instrument, so that the instrument is seen as way of 
‘voicing one’s body’ (p. 87).  In their view this conception of the relationship is inadequate 
because it elides the role of the instrument itself in creating music.  They propose instead 
a relationship of ‘participation and engagement, in which the instrument itself suggests to 
us specific ideas of its texture and materiality.  This means that the performer only 
becomes acquainted with the “thing” at hand by being able to test boundaries, negotiate 
subtleties and uncover threshold conditions.’  (p. 88)  They give the example of performer, 
David Moss who describes his relationship with his drums in these terms: ‘when I touch 
the rough, textured surface of a drum-skin (which was once a cow’s skin!) I feel the story 
of time in the tiny (im)perfections, edges, ridges, and anti-gravity veins of former life’ (Moss 
quoted in Schroeder and Rebelo, p. 88).  This they characterise as a relationship of 
specificity, rather than adaptability; the technology (here, the musical instrument) is not 
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made invisible or imperceptible, but rather embraced in its difference and specificity – like 
the colourful prosthesis discussed earlier.   
 
This approach suggests that, rather than regarding the instrument as a 
seamless merging with, or a seamless extension of the body, the 
discontinuity between the performer and the instrument becomes the 
main concern. 
 In this line of thinking, the idea of seamlessly merging objects, which 
is often promoted in wearable technologies, neglects this intricate and 
vital relationship of performer/instrument.  (p. 88) 
 
And they go on to note that the strategy of invisibility often applied to the design of 
wearable technology would, if applied to music, have ‘robbed us of Jimi Hendrix’s guitar 
feedback, John Coltrane’s unique saxophone sound and John Cage’s prepared piano’ (p. 
90).  It was the sensuous engagement of Hendrix with his guitar – his tortured love for the 
instrument expressed in his manipulation of it – that created his unique sound; not the 
elision of the guitar.  Similarly, it is Coltrane’s part-teasing, part-mastering courting of the 
saxophone that creates his music, and Cage’s idiosyncratic deconstruction of the 
normative piano that produces his distinctive sound. 
 
If we extend this to wearable technologies, as Schroeder and Rebelo argue, we have a 
model for engagement that is not relegated to the realms of virtuality, or of rationality, but 
that is felt deep in the body.  It is an engagement that demands sensuous response to the 
material technology that is encountered (akin for Schroeder and Rebelo to ‘itching and 
scratching’ (p. 87)), so that this response is part of (and recognized as part of) the process 
of using the technology, which constitutes the (human-technology) hybrid.  The argument 
for this sensuous engagement is not simply that it makes the human subject more self-
conscious and self-reflexive in using technology, but also that it brings our attention back 
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to the materials we are using in a creative way.  As Schroeder and Rebelo argue: ‘Let us 
think what type of musical instrument a silk scarf might become, before incorporating a 
keyboard into it.’  (p. 90)  In other words, before imposing some preconceived notion 
(derived from a different technology) of what a particular application might be, first explore 
the properties of the materials with which we are working and look at how the materials 
themselves might enable the desired result. 
 
Material culture/bodily engagement 
Jewellers have had a particular role in this re-discovery of contemporary material culture.  
As Wallace, Deardon and Fisher note: ‘The fact that jewellery relates to the body or is 
worn close to the body, within the wearer’s personal space, gives it a particular intimacy 
that may be absent from other objects or devices that we encounter.’ (Wallace, Deardon 
and Fisher, 2007: 54-55)  Contemporary jewellery, for them, is not about the fashion of the 
high-street but about the re-definition of our relationships with objects, the environment 
and each other: ‘ … contemporary jewellery develops a discourse about relationships: 
between self and object, individuals and groups, maker, audience and practice.’ (p. 56)  
And they are writing this in the context of exploring the meanings and possibilities of digital 
jewellery, also the focus of research and practice for Edinburgh jeweller and researcher, 
Sarah Kettley.   
 
In an article that describes her experiments with speckled computing in jewellery and its 
use by female friendship groups Kettley concludes:  ‘Contemporary craft practice was 
found to be embodied, or ‘smeared’, in a continuous and apparently inefficient way across 
the previously discrete steps of the design process.’ (Kettley 2007b: 13)  As a result there 
is no discrete separation of object or artefact from user, of design from material, or of 
designer from wearer; instead Kettley proposes a model of craft practice that engages all 
interactants as well as the material, social and cultural practices in which they are 
engaged.  Kettley concludes: 
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It seems that contemporary craft is well placed to inform the critical 
design of ubiquitous wearable artifacts with social meaning, and that an 
alternative market area may be available to the paradigm should a real 
commitment to thoughtful practice be made.  As a result, it is 
recommended that crafts practitioners seek to position themselves, as 
designers and artists are doing, as informed and available to such 
practice, and that wearables developers actively consider contemporary 
craft as a resource in approaching social complexity in design. (p. 13) 
 
This move to a craft paradigm, with its focus on embodiment and materiality, indicates 
dissatisfaction with the distanced, removed, rationalist assumptions of computing science 
– and with a notion of design that is separate from the development of the artifact (brought 
in to the process at the end to make the product attractive to users).  Implicit in all of these 
descriptions – and explicit in that of Schroeder and Rebelo – is an erotics not of power and 
control, but of touching and being touched – of an intense being-with that transforms the 
technology from an artifact to an experience – which subsequently becomes an aspect of 
the negotiated being of the user. 
 
FROTTAGE    
Philosopher, Andy Clark writes of successful interfaces: ‘What makes such interfaces 
appropriate as mechanisms for human enhancement is, it seems, precisely their potential 
role in creating whole new agent-world circuits.’ (Clark, 2007: 265)  Again, we might think 
of those ‘agent-world circuits’ as hybrids or cyborgs, with Clark’s formulation – like the 
explanations by jewellers (above) of the engagement with material culture – revealing the 
active, process-driven nature of that entity.   
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In the same paper Clark theorizes how embodied subjects interact with technology, as 
they always have, to create new ways of doing and being, new knowledges.  Human 
brains operate, he argues, not as some kind of library with a fixed body of information to 
which all experience is referred, but as  
 
… promiscuously body-and-world exploiting.  They are forever testing 
and exploring the possibilities for incorporating new resources and 
structures deep into their problem-solving regimes … the minds of … 
systems continuously re-negotiating their own limits, components, data-
stores and interfaces.  (p. 277) 
 
The consequence of this understanding of embodied being is that ‘the body (any given 
biological or bio-technological body) is both critically important and constantly negotiable.’ 
(p. 277)  This is to say, the body interacts interrogatively and creatively with the material 
culture of technology to create new knowledge, which simultaneously re-negotiates the 
nature of that embodiment.  Clark goes on to note that the nightmare visions of human 
minds taken over by technology (e.g. artificial intelligence) relies on a static, non-
negotiative model of human agency: 
 
But human minds are not old-fashioned CPU’s trapped in fixed and 
increasingly feeble corporeal shells.  Instead, they are the surprisingly 
plastic minds of profoundly embodied agents: agents whose boundaries 
and components are forever negotiable, and for whom body, thinking, 
and sensing are woven flexibly (and repeatedly) from the whole cloth of 
situated, intentional action.  (p. 278) 
 
Clark’s argument again provides a gloss to the research described by the jewellers in the 
previous section, specifying the role of bodily engagement with technology in the formation 
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of human being.  The value of Clark’s formulation is that it locates this bodily engagement 
not as something new, but as a fundamental aspect of embodied human being, which is 
endlessly negotiable.  So there is no need to fear the engagement with new technologies 
as it is, in Clark’s theory, simply evidence of the problem-solving work of human being in 
action.  We notice it simply because the technology is new, not yet naturalised as part of 
everyday life. 
 
I called this final section ‘frottage’ in order to capture – though without its perverse 
meaning – the kind of rubbing against or rubbing together that constitutes this bodily 
engagement.  One of the meanings of frottage is ‘the obtaining of sexual pleasure by 
rubbing the clothed body against that of others’ (Encarta Encyclopedia, on-line) though 
this meaning refers also to the perverse practice of rubbing up against strangers without 
their consent.  It is frustrating that there is no commonly available term in English to 
describe the productive pleasure of rubbing against something – masturbation, probably 
the closest.  Yet this too is a specifically sexual form of rubbing.  The term we need to 
capture this re-visioning of the human-technology relationship is something like the Anlo-
Ewe term described by anthropologist, Kathryn Lynn Geurts – seselelame, which she 
translates as ‘feel-feel-at flesh-inside’ and which expresses the sensory interplay that 
forms the basis of consciousness in the culture of the Anlo-Ewe people of West Africa 
(Geurts, 2005: 175).  As Clark and many of the theorists discussed in this essay have 
argued, contemporary western consciousness is similarly grounded in and dependent on a 
fully embodied engagement with the world, including the technologies that are 
characteristic of contemporary western societies.  This is a sensory engagement which is 
sexual but also sensual and sensuous, and which exists not in isolation from mind or 
intellect but as part of the ‘agent-world circuit’ that is our being-in-the-world.   
 
We engage with these new technologies and applications through our senses, our 
emotions, and our intellect – that is, fully corporeally – and it is this complex engagement 
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that enables us to embed these technologies in our lives.  It is also what enables us, at 
times, to create ways of using applications unforseen by their designers: the popularity of 
text-messaging being a major contemporary example.  As many of the theorists/creators 
(jewellers, designers, musicians) discussed above argue, the most appropriate metaphor 
for this interaction is one that acknowledges the intense sensory nature/pleasure of that 
engagement, for which they use a range of tactile metaphors.  The important distinction 
they draw is between a hybrid or cyborg figure in which the technology has been elided or 
subsumed by the human (or, in nightmare scenarios, has taken over the human) and one 
in which the human-technology interaction is perceptible, self-conscious, negotiative, 
knowing – a source of pleasure, creativity, and of increased self-knowledge, as well as of 
new knowledge. 
 
In our engagement with wearable technology we have a range of possible imaginaries 
available to us, including human-tool extension, prosthetic enhancement, human-
technology augmentation, and bodily engagement.  In each case the figure of the human-
machine hybrid or cyborg is a shadowy presence, which sometimes offers the possibility of 
a being beyond the known and familiar, sometimes simply reiterates and reinforces the 
known.  Wearable technology can be conceived and analysed by reference to all of these 
imaginaries, and each yields its own possibilities and concerns.  However, it is the most 
recent work arguing for specificity of engagement with the material culture of the 
technology that seems most productive now.  And it is no accident that this comes at a 
time when western societies are reconsidering the role of the senses in our engagement 
with the world – and hence the role of the senses in the formation of individual subjectivity 
and in the generation of knowledge.  It is precisely the demand on/for bodily engagement 
made by new technology that has necessitated this re-negotiation.  And it is that re-
negotiation that can lead to the most creative ways of using the potentials opened up by 
technology in a range of fields, including that of wearable technology.   
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i My thanks to Cathy Hawkins for this point 
ii My argument here is that the worshipper deploys the haptic sense of proprioception – the 
internal sense of being in space/time – to generate a feeling-with the sufferings of Christ 
